Chapter 1: An Introduction to the Psychology of Embodiment

Authors: Michael D. Robinson (michael.d.robinson@ndsu.edu), North Dakota State University, USA, & Laura E. Thomas (laura.e.thomas@ndsu.edu), North Dakota State University, USA

The editors will define the construct of embodiment and trace its development in Western thought as well as within psychology. They will also explain the organization of the book and provide a brief (1 paragraph) introduction to each chapter. This material will be written after the bulk of the chapters have been accepted, thus best matching the form of the published volume.

Section 1: Theoretical Foundations

Although all definitions of embodiment emphasize the relevance of body-based (e.g., sensory or motoric) processes to some extent, there is actually a diversity of relevant theoretical perspectives (Schwarz & Lee, in press). In the first section of the volume, we sought to gather some of these perspectives into a single place, so that the reader can use the relevant material as a basis for understanding some of the more empirical chapters that follow. The relevant chapters cover several major theoretical perspectives, which include grounded cognition (Barsalou, 2008), interoception (Craig, 2003), and conceptual metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).

Chapter 2: Dynamic Grounding of Concepts: Implications for Emotion and Social Cognition

Contact Author: Piotr Winkielman (pwinkielman@ucsd.edu), University of California, San Diego, USA

Other Authors (If Known): Seana Coulson, Josh Davis, and Andy Arnold

According to embodied cognition theories, concepts are grounded in neural systems that produce experiential and motor states. Concepts are also contextually situated and thus engage sensorimotor resources in a dynamic, flexible way. Finally, conceptual understanding unfolds in time, reflecting embodied as well as linguistic and social influences. In this chapter, we focus on concepts from the domain of social cognition and emotion while detailing ways in which (and circumstances under which) they link to sensorimotor and interoceptive systems.

Chapter 3: The Feelings-as-Information Perspective on Embodiment

Contact Author: Gerald L. Clore (gc4q@virginia.edu), University of Virginia, USA

We focus on emotions and feeling, the embodied nature of which reflects more than their bodily concomitants. We explore several themes including that: (1) Feelings are difficult to describe in words. But feelings can be characterized (and partially elicited) by choosing words with the right connotations. As seen in literature, song, poetry, and drama, the connotative meanings of words allow hearers and readers to feel as well as to understand. (2) The feelings-as-information approach (Clore, Schiller, & Shaked, 2018), augmented with cognitive priming processes, illuminate the confusing and sometimes controversial findings concerning embodied metaphors. We examine evidence concerning whether such phenomena involve metaphor or merely associative relationships. We also address questions about the conditions under which the effects are reversible. (3) Finally, we step back and view embodied psychology from a resource perspective. We draw on behavioral ecology and the embodied perception work of Proffitt (2006) to ask how the needs for social and physical resources guide human behavior.

Chapter 4: Interoceptive Approaches to Embodiment

Contact Author: André Schulz (andre.schulz@uni.lu), University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg

Other Authors (If Known): Claus Vögele

Interoception is defined as a mechanism to process and perceive internal bodily signals. Influential theories concerning such processes, such as the multi-faceted model by Garfi