Artificial life embodies a recent and important conceptual step in modern science: asserting that the core of intelligence and cognitive abilities is the same as the capacity for living. The recent surge of interest in artificial life has pushed a whole range of engineering traditions, such as control theory and robotics, beyond classical notions of goal and planning into biologically inspired notions of viability and adaptation, situatedness and operational closure. These proceedings serve two important functions: they address bottom-up theories of artificial intelligence and explore what can be learned from simple models such as insects about the cognitive processes and characteristic autonomy of living organisms, while also engaging researchers and philosophers in an examination of the epistemological basis of this new trend. Contributors include: H. Bersini, D. Parisi, R.A. Brooks, C.G. Langton, S. Kauffman, J.L. Denenbourg, P. Maes, J. Holland, T. Smithers, H. Swefel, H. Muhlenbein.