What is consciousness and why is it so philosophically and scientifically puzzling? For many years philosophers approached this question assuming a standard physicalist framework, on which consciousness can be explained by contemporary physics, biology, neuroscience and cognitive science. This book is a debate between two philosophers who are united in their rejection this kind of "standard" physicalism- but who differ sharply in what lesson to draw from this. Amy Kind defends dualism 2.0, a thoroughly modern version of dualism (the theory that there are two fundamentally different kinds of things in the world, those that are physical and those that are mental) decoupled from any religious or non-scientific connotations. Daniel Stoljar defends non-standard physicalism, a kind of physicalism different from both the standard version and dualism 2.0. The book presents a cutting-edge assessment of the philosophy of consciousness, and a glimpse at what the future study of this area might bring.

Key Features






Outlines the different things people mean by 'consciousness' and provides an account of what consciousness is



Reviews the key arguments for thinking that consciousness is incompatible with physicalism



Explores and provides a defense of contrasting responses to those arguments, with a special focus on responses that reject the standard physicalist framework



Provides an account of the basic aims of the science of consciousness



Written in a lively and accessibly style



Includes a comprehensive glossary