Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this unique book reproduces important Congressional and government documents dealing with the ongoing Boeing 737 MAX aircraft controversy. Contents include: The Boeing 737 MAX Aircraft: Costs, Consequences, and Lessons from its Design, Development, and Certification (March 2020 House Committee Report) * The Boeing 737 Max: Examining the Design, Development, and Marketing of the Aircraft - with testimony of Dennis Muilenburg, President and Chief Executive Officer, The Boeing Company (October 2019) * Status of the Boeing 737 Max: Stakeholder Perspectives (June 2019) * Official Report of the Special Committee to review the Federal Aviation Administration's Aircraft Certification Process (January 2020) * NTSB Safety Recommendation Report Regarding Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines Accidents.

On March 8, 2017, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) granted an amended type certificate to The Boeing Company (Boeing) for the 737-8 aircraft, the first of the 737 MAX family, which is the successor to the company's 737 Next Generation (NG) aircraft. The 737 MAX was the 12th derivative model of the 737 aircraft, which was first certified in 1967. The 737 MAX entered revenue passenger service with Malindo Air, a Malaysian air carrier, two months after its FAA certification. Seventeen months later the 737 MAX suffered its first fatal crash.

On October 29, 2018, Indonesian carrier Lion Air operating flight 610 from Soekarno—Hatta International Airport in Jakarta to Depati Amir Airport in Pangkal Pinang, crashed into the Java Sea 13 minutes after takeoff, killing all 189 passengers and crew. One Indonesian rescue diver also died during recovery efforts. Less than five months later, on March 10, 2019, in strikingly similar circumstances, Ethiopian Airlines flight 302—another 737 MAX aircraft—crashed six minutes after takeoff on a flight from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to Nairobi, Kenya, killing all 157 passengers and crew, including eight U.S. citizens.

For two brand-new aircraft, of a brand-new derivative model, to crash within five months of each other was extraordinary and unprecedented in modern times. While multiple factors led to these accidents, both crashes shared a key contributing factor: a new software system called the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), which Boeing developed to address stability issues in certain flight conditions induced by the plane's new, larger engines, and their relative placement on the 737 MAX aircraft compared to the engines' placement on the 737 NG. The FAA grounded the 737 MAX three days after the Ethiopian Airlines crash, following similar actions taken by China, the European Union, and Canada, among others. Despite optimistic predictions at the time—that a simple software fix would allow the 737 MAX to return quickly to service —the aircraft has been grounded for nearly one year, with even more new safety issues emerging since.

The Committee's preliminary findings identify five central themes that affected the design, development, and certification of the 737 MAX and FAA's oversight of Boeing. Acts, omissions, and errors occurred across multiple stages and areas of the development and certification of the 737 MAX. These themes are present throughout the investigative findings listed below. Production Pressures. There was tremendous financial pressure on Boeing and subsequently the 737 MAX program to compete with Airbus' A320neo aircraft. Among other things, this pressure resulted in extensive efforts to cut costs, maintain the 737 MAX program schedule, and not slow down the 737 MAX production line. The Committee's investigation has identified several instances where the desire to meet these goals and expectations jeopardized the safety of the flying public.