This project is intended to be a report of what went wrong with the both the response, and later the investigation, of the terrible events of April 18-19, 2020 in Portapique and other areas of central Nova Scotia. There were 22 people (plus an unborn child) killed over the course of 13 hours, over half of whom could still be alive had there been a series of better decisions made by police.

The Mass Casualty Commission that investigated the police shortcomings developed and used an experimental process which ended up fostering confusion and frustration. The MCC had at least as many problems as the police/emergency response they were examining, and has become a warning sign of how a public inquiry can go astray.

There was much to be examined, with thousands of pages of disclosure and 75 days of inquiry proceedings. This Rodgers Brief Report is an attempt to distill that into its essential elements. That requires first a look back at some parts of the life of the killer, Gabriel Wortman, some of his interactions with police, and things he did over the years that should have attracted police attention, including how he amassed such a fortune in cash, property, and personal possessions.

Then, I go through the events themselves, constructing the most plausible narrative of what happened, based on all that we now know, identifying key turning points, and where better decisions could have been made that would have saved lives. There were several very clear such points, and others that were perhaps more subtle.

After reviewing the events, I will outline the after-event scrambling by the RCMP to explain what they did, while also trying to hide what they really did. I will review the way Wortman’s spouse, Lisa Banfield, has been treated and perceived, and how the RCMP’s early manipulation of her has robbed us all of a valuable opportunity to learn more about what happened.

Eventually, the Mass Casualty Commission called to examine the events would face its own criticisms. It was with a significant degree of irony that much of this criticism related to the MCC being secretive, having a closed off communications strategy, and an overly opaque and bureaucratic structure. In such ways, the MCC took on the flawed characteristics of the RCMP it was tasked with investigating.

There were many flaws in the development of the MCC, and then the way the inquiry unfolded. Primarily, however, the criticism was generated from the MCC’s seeming unwillingness to address the core questions around the performance and culture of the RCMP, and how those things affected the police’s dealing with the killer.

The MCC proceedings are over now, and the Commissioners’ report, which was due to be delivered on November 1, 2022, has been delayed (without compelling reasons) for five months. I followed the MCC throughout, doing daily summaries and analysis for the general public. I also committed to preparing this alternative report, which I think (and hope) will contribute just as much to the formation of public opinion as the official version.

From all of the information that emerged in the MCC, and with additional details and circumstantial evidence from other sources, I have attempted to construct what really took place over the 13-hours of the killing spree(s). I will start with the killer, his background, and what was known to police. Then, I will detail what happened and where the police made mistakes of consequence. Finally, I will review the MCC process as it unfolded, in the hopes that future public inquires can learn from the costly errors that have been undermining the credibility of this inquiry since the beginning.