Military mistakes impel strategic reflection. The French Indochina War (FIW) from 1946-1954 furnishes useful insights with some resonance for current challenges. A combination of pre-exiting conditions, catalysts and operational drivers caused the cathartic 1954 French defeat. Pre-conditions included the illegitimacy of the colonial regime and repression that polarised nationalist sentiment. Economically, pernicious terms of trade suppressed industrialisation but oiled speculation until suddenly reversed by devaluation in 1953 that reflected financial disengagement by France but increased American involvement. Vacillating metropolitan and the dubious colonial regime of the 'night club' Emperor, Bảo Đại, fuelled political instability. Militarily, after the disastrous evacuation of the RC4 in 1950, Việt Minh men and supplies poured across the Chinese frontier. In 1954, financial constraints and the looming international peace conference catalysed Navarre, the new French commander, to gamble on a battle of attrition. He tried to distract the Việt Minh and bet that they would be unable drag artillery to the remote jungle outpost of Diên Biên Phú, but he underestimated their focus, determination, strength, and adaptability. In early December partisans resented the bungled evacuation of Lai Châu. The entrenched camp's defences were inadequate and neither 141,500 artillery rounds, infantry sorties nor napalm suppressed VM guns, entrenched in the surrounding jungle-clad hills. The French aero-logistical sub-system was overstretched, its pilots worn out and significant parachute supplies fell into enemy hands. Navarre scattered his reserves on a futile and remote side show, Operation Atlante. The Americans, although financing, supplying and covertly assisting the French, prevaricated and refused to unleash their B29 fleet. 'Iacta alea esto' or 'ἀνερρίφθω κύβος' - let the die be cast.