The recent war in Chechnya, despite all the media coverage, remains a confusing tangle for many people. The war was the result of many conflicting political, economic, judicial, and military issues that had been fermenting for decades. Only the most fundamental goals became clearly visible: for Moscow, the preservation of its territorial integrity; for Chechens, the struggle for national independence. In this carefully researched and extensively documented study, Stasys Knezys and Romanas Sedlickas examine the Chechnyan war from a military viewpoint. As they evenhandedly depict the strengths and weaknesses of both the Russians and Chechens, the authors consider how and why Russia, with one of the world's largest armies, failed to subdue the Chechens, and how the Chechens fought among themselves, yet also fought off the Russian Goliath.

One reason the Chechens had the success they did was the expansion of the relationship of "politics and war" to the triangle of "politics, war, and terrorism." Knezys and Sedlickas examine this question: "Is military terrorism . . . a new tactical element, ensuring the success of a small country's resistance to a powerful army?"

The War in Chechnya does not answer all the questions raised by this war, but it presents comprehensive, objective, impartial information about the military strategy and nature and conduct of operations on both sides to allow the reader to begin to answer some of those questions. Military analysts and historians, political scientists, and Eastern European scholars will find The War in Chechnya an illuminating analysis of the military operations there and a valuable source of information for further studies.