This work reexamines the political and military aspects of the Revolution of 1399 that removed Richard II and placed Henry of Lancaster on the English throne. It argues that Henry of Lancaster was not the "all conquering" hero of 1399 but was rather the leader of a coalition of disaffected noblemen who had old scores to settle with Richard II. It also proposes that Richard II was not an incompetent king whose personality disorder(s) and/or tyrannical behavior brought about his fall. Rather, it argues that the king was in no worse a political position in 1399 than in 1387 or even 1381. As on the previous two great crises of the reign, the king forwent a military option of dealing with his opponents and decided to let the issues of 1399 play themselves out on the field of politics. Both in 1381 and 1387 this tactic had proven effective and there was nothing to suggest in 1399 that it would not be so again.