This report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. This paper explores analysis in intelligence and evaluates a proposal to certify and convey analytical rigor as it relates to intelligence products. To accomplish this, an examination of intelligence failures is conducted to assess the application of analytical rigor across historic case studies. The historic failures demonstrate gaps in standardization and insufficiencies in analytical rigor. This paper proposes establishing unit-level certified Masters of Analytic Tradecraft (MAT) analysts to be trained and entrusted to evaluate and rate the standards and analytical rigor of intelligence products prior to publication. This certification model is based on research of the structure of professional civilian corporations. Implementing the MAT analyst certification will allow decision makers to judge the robustness of analysis so that they can meter their trust accordingly. This certification will hold the intelligence community accountable for their adherence to established analytical standards, ensure compliance is properly conveyed, and promote quality of analysis.

1. Introduction * 2. Background * 3. Sufficiency of Analytical Rigor * 4. Proposal * 5. Research Methodology * 6. Analysis/Evaluation * 7. Recommendations
   
   This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.

Unfortunately, examples of high-consequence, high-profile intelligence fails have been common, revealing a consistent lack of analytical sufficiency and raising concerns about the condition of US intelligence. The 2003 assessment of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is one example of a catastrophic failure on the part of the intelligence community (IC). The report from the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Commission report) summarized the assessment failures that informed the 2003 invasion of Iraq: “This failure was in large part the result of analytical shortcomings; intelligence analysts were too wedded to their assumptions about Saddam’s intentions... We conclude that the Intelligence Community was dead wrong in almost all of its pre-war judgments about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction...[There existed] serious errors in analyzing... [and a] failure to make clear just how much of its analysis was based on assumptions, rather than good evidence.”

This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.